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Abstract
This study assesses how banking sector integration and especially cross-border
lending aect macroeconomic stability. I use a two-country general equilibrium
model with heterogeneous banks that are hit by idiosyncratic shocks. Accord-
ing to the concept of granularity, idiosyncratic shocks to large rms (or: banks)
do not have to cancel out under a skewed distribution of rm sizes. Given the
highly skewed distribution of bank sizes, macroeconomic stability may thus be
aected by shocks to large banks. Hence, to grasp the impact of nancial lib-
eralization on aggregate uctuations, the presence of large banks as measured
by high concentration in the banking industry has to be accounted for. I study
the role of dierent forms of banking sector integration - i.e. arms-length cross-
border lending versus lending via foreign aliates - for the stability of aggregate
lending. I nd that banking sector integration decreases the aggregate volatility
of lending due to intensied competition. The model implies that international
lending is more stable under lending via foreign aliates than under arms-length
cross-border lending.
Keywords: Cross-border banking, large banks, granularity, volatility.
JEL Codes: E44, F41, G21
Contact: DIW Berlin, Mohrenstr. 58, 10117 Berlin, Germany, Phone: +49 (0)30 - 897 89 590,
E-mail: fbremus@diw.de. The paper presents the author's personal opinion and does not necessarily
reect the views of the institute. I am grateful to Claudia Buch, Katheryn Russ, and Fabio Ghironi
for helpful comments. All errors and inconsistencies are solely my own responsibility.1 Motivation
Since the mid-1990s, the activities of Western European banks in Eastern Europe
have signicantly increased. Closer nancial integration in Europe has basically two
eects on macroeconomic stability in the region. On the one hand, it allows for better
insurance against local shocks via the facilitated access to international credit. On the
other hand, increased banking sector integration may raise the probability of spill-overs
from adverse shocks that occur abroad.1
Taking the global nancial crisis of 2008/2009 as an example for a large adverse
shock hitting the banking sector, how was macroeconomic stability aected in East-
ern and Western Europe? During the crisis, although Eastern European economies
experienced a sharp reversal of cross-border lending, a full-edged emerging market
crisis associated with the typical sudden-stop situation held o; Western European
parent banks maintained funding of their foreign aliates in the East (EBRD, 2009).
As a consequence, capital outows from Eastern Europe were relatively modest. Ce-
torelli and Goldberg (2009) show that capital outows were much larger in emerging
economies like Latin America or Asia, where nancial integration involves direct cross-
border lending rather than the presence of foreign subsidiaries. More generally, the
specic structure of banking sector integration in Europe seems to have had a positive
eect on the stability of cross-border lending: Recent empirical studies point to the fact
that local lending by foreign banks' presences in Eastern Europe has been more stable
than direct cross-border lending (Bergloef, Korniyenko, Plekhanov, and Zettelmeyer
(2009), McCauley, McGuire, and von Peter (2010), De Haas and Van Horen (2011))
2. Theoretical modeling of the eects of dierent forms of cross-border banking on
aggregate stability is still lagging behind.
[Table 1 about here.]
This study models international lending in a general equilibrium framework. The
goal is to clarify the role that dierent forms of banking sector integration play for the
1Contagion may occur via the interbank market as in Allen and Gale (2000) or via asset price eects
as for example in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). For a summary over the costs and benets of
cross-border banking, see for example Schoenmaker and Wagner (2011).
2Apart from the specic structure of integration, the "Vienna Initiative" has played a crucial role
for the stabilization of capital ows between Eastern and Western Europe during the crisis. In January
2009, the IMF, the EBRD and the EC launched a series of meetings with large international banks
operating in Eastern Europe. Banks agreed upon sticking to their exposures in Eastern Europe in
order to prevent large withdrawals from emerging Europe. For details on the Vienna Initiative, see
EBRD 2011 and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010).
1stability of aggregate credit. I distinguish direct cross-border lending and the cross-
border provision of loans via foreign presences of commercial banks, that is foreign
aliates.
To understand the impact of banking sector integration on macroeconomic uctua-
tions, it has to be taken into account that the banking sector is highly concentrated with
a few large, systemically important nancial institutions (SIFIs) which are strongly in-
volved in cross-border activity. Due to the coexistence of a small number of these very
large banks and many small ones, the distribution of bank sizes is strongly skewed to
the right. According to Gabaix (2011), under a fat-tailed power law distribution of
rm sizes, idiosyncratic shocks to large rms do not have to cancel out, so that they
may impact on aggregate volatility. In fact, Gabaix (2011) shows that idiosyncratic
shocks to large rms can explain roughly one third of aggregate output uctuations in
the US.
This logic also applies to the banking industry. Using balanced panel data for
the period 2000-2007 from the Bankscope database for the EU27 countries, Table 1
provides evidence for high concentration in the European banking sector. It shows that
the largest 10 percent of banks in the sample hold nearly 80 percent of the assets since
the mid-2000s. Evidence from the European Central Bank (ECB, 2007) points into the
same direction: In 2005, 46 European banking-groups (out of a total of 8,000 banks)
held nearly 70 percent of total EU banking assets. Plotting the empirical histograms
for the EU27 countries, Figure 1 illustrates the bank size distribution in Europe in
2009. Bank size is measured by total assets as well as by total netloans. The bank
size distributions shown here resemble a power law with a fat right tail: There are
many small banks and a few very large ones which hold the majority of assets in the
banking sector. We will see below that the size distributions can be well described by
a Pareto distribution which follows a power law. Hence, the conditions for granularity
presented by Gabaix (2011) should be met in the banking sector, too. A model which
aims at examining the link between banking sector integration and volatility should
thus account for the presence of large banks.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The two-country model used in this study is based on work by De Blas and Russ
(2010, 2011a) who take both the market structure in the banking industry, and dierent
forms of cross-border lending into account. They dierentiate between two scenarios
of international nancial liberalization. On the one hand, the economy is opened up
to direct cross-border lending. On the other hand, foreign direct investment (FDI)
in the banking sector is allowed for, so that international lending via banks' foreign
2presences can be studied. Building on this general equilibrium model, I assess, in a
rst step, how the two forms of integration aect the market structure in the banking
industry. To that goal, I compute the banking sector's Herndahl index to measure
market concentration. The Herndahl index is dened as the squared sum of bank's
market shares, where market shares are given by the fraction of individual banks' credit
supply in total credit.
In a second step, I apply the concept of granularity to the model following Di Gio-
vanni and Levchenko (2009), in order to analyze how the change in market concentra-
tion in turn impacts on aggregate stability3. While Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009)
study the eects of trade integration on market structure and aggregate volatility, I
focus on nancial integration: How do shocks to large banks impact on the volatility
of total and cross-border lending in the two regions? And how do the results dier for
dierent forms of integration, namely (i) arms-length cross-border lending versus (ii)
international lending via foreign subsidiaries? Buch, Koch, and Koetter (2011b) doc-
ument that, unlike manufacturing rms, nearly all German banks (96%) are engaged
in cross-border activities. Given the high degree of internationalization in the banking
sector, a study of the eects of nancial integration on macroeconomic volatility is
highly relevant for the policy and regulatory debate.
Three key ndings emerge from the model simulations. First, when opening up
to direct cross-border lending, lending rates and concentration decrease while markups
do not signicantly change. Interpreting loan volumes as a proxy for banks' size,
the model implies that opening up the economy to competition from abroad yields
a somewhat less concentrated banking system. This, in turn, reduces the aggregate
volatility of total lending, since according to the concept of granularity, the aggregate
volatility of lending is determined as the product of idiosyncratic volatility and market
concentration.
Second, when allowing for FDI in the banking sector, markups do not remain as
under loan liberalization. They rather increase due to eciency gains as in De Blas
and Russ (2010). However, concentration and lending rates still fall when compared to
the closed economy setup. Hence, the stability of total lending is again strengthened.
Third, the share of cross-border lending in total lending is smaller under FDI
liberalization than under direct cross-border lending for two symmetric economies.
When it comes to the stability of cross-border lending, the model implies a signicantly
lower volatility of cross-border lending under FDI liberalization than under arms-length
cross-border lending.
3Buch, Russ, and Schnitzer (2011a) implement the concept of granularity in a closed-economy
search-model with heterogeneous banks.
3The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the bench-
mark model with heterogeneous banks under nancial autarky. Section 3 discusses
the model setup as well as the simulation results for the two forms of banking sector
integration. In the rst part, the implications of loan liberalization are discussed, while
the ndings for FDI liberalization are presented in the second part of the section. The
last section concludes and suggests avenues for future research.
2 Benchmark: Heterogeneous banks and aggregate
stability in the closed economy
Before having a look at the mechanisms at work in the two-country setup, I rst consider
the structure of the closed economy model as a benchmark. The general equilibrium
model described below is based on work by De Blas and Russ (2010) who study the
evolution of markups after nancial liberalization. I adjust the model in order to study
the implications of nancial openness for (i) the market structure in the banking sector
and (ii) for the aggregate stability of cross-border and total lending.
The model features three agents: households, rms and banks. Households con-
sume a nal good and supply labor and deposits to rms. Firms produce the nal
good under perfect competition using labor, and borrow a credit portfolio from banks
in order to nance the wage bill paid to workers. The model replicates some impor-
tant empirical regularities for the European banking industry: Banks supply dierent
types of credit under imperfect competition4. They are heterogeneous with respect
to their eciency of lending. This heterogeneity in eciency translates into a skewed
distribution of banks' sizes as observed in the empirical data (see Figure 1).
2.1 Model setup
Households. In the model economy, there is a continuum of identical households on
the interval [0;1]. The representative consumer supplies labor, ht in exchange for the
nominal wage wt, and deposits his savings, dt, at the certain deposit rate  r at banks.
The deposit rate is risk-free here, since full deposit insurance is assumed. Households
are thus indierent of where to deposit their savings. The consumer receives prot
income from owning rms and banks, 
 and , respectively. He consumes a single
nal good, qt, which is dened as the num eraire so that its price pt can be normalized
4Using data for the period 1992-1996, De Bandt and Davis (2000) show that the banking industry
in the Euro area is not fully competitive
4to 1.





















subject to the budget constraint
dt+1 + qt = (1 +  r)dt + wtht + 
 +  (1)
where  is the elasticity of labor supply and  denotes the coecient of relative risk
aversion.
Solving the households' optimization problem with respect to the three choice vari-
ables qt;ht;dt+1 yields, together with the budget contraint (1), the following system of
rst order conditions for optimal consumption, labor supply and savings:
q
 
t = t (2)
h
1=
t = twt (3)
t = t+1(1 +  r) (4)
where t represents the additional utility of relaxing the budget constraint by one unit,
i.e. the marginal utility of consumption.





= (1 +  r) (5)
which determines the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption. The marginal
benet of consuming one additional unit in period t equals the marginal cost of foregoing
consumption in period t + 1.






Firms. The model features a continuum of identical rms on the interval [0;1]
which produce the nal good, y, under perfect competition. The representative rm de-








ld. Modeling loan demand using the Dixit-Stiglitz approach of bundling varieties is a
reduced form for modeling the credit market which simplies aggregation. Gerali, Neri,
Sessa, and Signoretti (2010) and Huelsewig, Mayer, and Wollmershaeuser (2009) take a
similar shortcut. Assuming that the representative rm demands a CES-basket of loan
5varieties is equivalent to setting up the model such that a continuum of rms takes
a single homogeneous loan from a particular bank under a discrete choice approach
(see Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1987) and Bruggemann, Kleinert, and Prieto
(2011))5. Loans are needed because rms have to pay out the wage bill to workers
before they have actually earned sales revenues. Hence, the total volume of credit
demanded by the representative rm amounts to its wage payments6.
Firms produce the nal output good y using labor as the only input factor to the
production function y = Ah1 . Time subscripts are dropped in the remaining analysis
as I focus on steady state analysis. The representative rm's prot maximization





1    wh   r`
d
where r denotes the lending rate and `d  wh, so that

 = Ah
1    (1 + r)wh:
The rst order condition determines labor demand as a function of the aggregate lend-































where  is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the J credit varieties.
Derivation of the Lagrangian with respect to loan demand from bank j, ld(j), yields






where  is the shadow price of the constraint, that is the amount that is spend more
if total loan demand ld increases by one unit. This amounts to the aggregate interest
5For other general equilibrium models featuring imperfect competition in the banking sector and
loan dieretiation, see for example Mandelman (2010) and Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010).
6The focus of this paper is to analyze the implications of shocks to large banks for the aggregate
stability of credit. Therefore, I do not explicitly model why nancial intermediaries exist. The
objective here is to take the observation of a skewed bank size distribution as given and study the
implications for aggregate stability thereof.
6rate on loans, r, such that  = r. Plugging r into (9) and simplifying, we obtain the









with `d = wh. Loan demand in niche j positively depends on total loan demand `d.
It negatively depends on the lending rate in niche j relative to the aggregate average
lending rate r. The corresponding Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate interest rate is derived in










Banks. While consumers and rms are assumed to be identical, banks are assumed
to dier in terms of their eciency and hence in their size. Similar to the modeling of
the "love for variety"with Dixit-Stiglitz consumer preferences, there is a xed number
of credit niches j = 1;:::;J. In each credit niche, n rival banks compete for supplying
loans to rms. This market fragmentation is in line with the empirical evidence for
European credit markets: Although international lending has steadily increased since
the mid-1990s, small and medium enterprises still face signicant dierences in lending
rates across the euro area (Allen, Beck, Carletti, Lane, Schoenmaker, and Wagner
(2011)). Banks' loan dierentiation can be interpreted as geographical fragmentation,
or banks' specialization for specic market segments, e.g. with respect to rm size or
industry (see Carletti, Hartmann, and Spagnolo (2007)). Moreover, one could think
about dierentiated loans as services of dierent type, like working capital loans versus
real estate loan, or as dierent loan characteristics with respect to collateralization or
maturity.
Banks dier in their eciency of extending credit: Each of the n banks in niche j
draws an eciency parameter zk(j) from a Pareto distribution







where z 2 (b;B] is a bank's ability to transform deposits to loans. The inverse of the
eciency parameter z, namely the cost parameter c = 1=z represents any per-unit non-
interest expenditure, for example the cost of management and technology or the bank's
cost to monitor borrowers. The cost parameters c can take on values on the interval
[1;1). This ensures that the lending rate r(j) is never smaller than the deposit rate
 r, since c  1 drives a wedge between the deposit and the loan rate. Consequently,
the eciency parameter zk(j) can take on values on the interval (0;1], so that I set the
7lower bound b close to zero and the upper bound B equal to one. The total cost per
unit of loan amounts to  rck(j) where  r is the risk-free deposit rate.
In each niche j, banks have some degree of market power and compete in Bertrand
fashion for loan demand, meaning that they undercut lending rates r(j) of their local
rivals until the lowest-cost bank absorbs the entire loan demand ld(j) in the niche.
Ranking banks with respect to their cost draws in ascending order such that c1(j) <
c2(j) < ::: < cn(j), unit costs in niche j are determined by the lowest-cost bank and
are thus given by c1(j) = minfck(j)g.
The maximum possible markup that a bank can charge without loosing all demand
to its competitors from neighboring niches is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz-markup  m =

 1. However, this maximum markup can be charged only if the second best bank in
niche j has a cost parameter which is suciently high. More precisely, the maximum
markup can be charged only if c2(j)   mc1(j). Otherwise, the maximum markup the
lowest-cost bank in niche j can charge is limited by c2 and given by the cost-ratio
m(j) =
c2(j)
c1(j). As a consequence, banks' lending-to-deposit-rate spreads are endogenous
and determined by the gap between the cost parameters of the rst and the second
best bank in each niche j.
Banks set optimal lending rates in niche j charging the endogenously determined








Prots consist in interest income net of funding costs
(j) = r(j)l
s(j)    rd(j) (12)
where ls(j) =
d(j)
ck(j) is loan supply. Due to the cost parameter c  1 the higher the cost
ck(j), the more deposits are needed to lend out a given amount ls(j).
Banks optimally set lending rates r(j) according to equation (11). Lending rates
and wages determine loan demand ld(j). In equilibrium, the loan market clears, so
that loan demand equals loan supply ld(j)  ls(j).
2.2 Steady State








8where (13) derives the constant deposit rate from the Euler equation, and (14) is labor
supply in steady state.
In order to compute the steady state, all variables are expressed in terms of wages,
w, and lending rates, r. Given that optimal lending rates can be computed directly
from the cost parameters, the steady state values of the model variables can be obtained
once they are expressed as functions of the lending rate and parameter values only. A
step-by-step derivation of the steady state can be found in Appendix A.2.
Concerning aggregation, the loan basket demanded by rm i is given by the CES-









. Because rms are identical, I nor-
malize the number of rms to N = 1. Consequently, the representative rm's loan






Deposit markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Thus, the volume of
deposits, d(j) = l(j)c1(j), results directly from optimal loan demand l(j) and costs
c1(j). Since full deposit insurance is assumed, consumers are indierent at which bank
to place their savings. In the aggregate, total deposits are determined by the sum over




In order to study the implications of idiosyncratic shocks to large banks for the ag-
gregate stability of lending, I implement the concept of granularity into the model.
The literature on nancial frictions in general equilibrium models has so far mainly
focused on frictions and shocks at the demand side of the credit market, i.e. at the
level of rms7. However, shocks at the supply side of credit are at least as important
for economic activity (see Gerali et al. (2010)). For example, Pesaran and Xu (2011)
model a credit shock by formulating an exogenous autoregressive process for the loan
to deposit ratio which is subject to an i.i.d. shock. However, in their model there is no
role for heterogeneous banks and idiosyncratic shocks.
I follow Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) and assume that each niche j is dis-
turbed by an i.i.d. sectoral cost-shock u(j) which shifts the economy away from its
optimal equilibrium allocation. This cost shock u(j) can represent, for example, an
unanticipated increase in the loan default rate in a certain market niche or geographic
region. Including the shock u(j), the marginal cost of lending is stochastic and given
7For example, nancial frictions at the rm side are motivated by the information asymmetry
between borrowers and lenders which give rise to agency costs and collateral constraints for borrowers.
See for example Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
9by  rc1(j)u(j). As shown by Gabaix (2011), the economy will be granular if the distri-
bution of bank sizes follows a power law with an exponent close to  1. In this case,
the distribution has a fat tail and decays slower in the number of banks J than a
normal distribution does (slower than J (1=2)). With bank sizes following a fat-tailed
power law, micro-level shocks do not cancel out in the aggregate but will be felt at the
macro-level.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 plots the empirical histograms from the Bankscope database together
with the PDFs of the tted Pareto distributions for the size distribution of banks in
the EU27 countries. I also dierentiate between the subgroup of Eastern and Western
European countries. It can be seen that a Pareto distribution with a shape parameter 
below one is well able to describe the bank size distributions in the EU. Given that the
Pareto distribution follows a power law with shape parameter  , Figure 2 provides
evidence that the distribution of bank sizes in the EU indeed follows a fat-tailed power
law distribution. Thus, the conditions for the European banking sector to be granular
seem to be satised in the data.
Following Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) and Di Giovanni, Levchenko, and
Ranciere (2010) who implement the concept of granularity in a Melitz (2003)-model
of heterogeneous rms, the variance of the aggregate volume of credit is derived as
follows. Credit demand for each bank is dened as
l(c1;u) =











where index j is dropped since demand dynamics are the same across all niches in the
















  1 = ~ u   1






= var(~ u) = 
2
u : (16)




















































u  HHI (21)
where 2
u = var(~ u) and HHI is the Herndahl-index of concentration, which is dened
as the sum of squared market shares. The market share of an individual bank j is
given here by its share of credit in total credit. Equation (21) illustrates that the
aggregate volatility of loans is the product of micro-level volatility - the variance of the
sectoral shock u(j) that hits banks in each niche - and concentration measured by the
HHI. Once concentration in the banking sector increases, that is if the distribution
of bank sizes gets more unequal and thus the Herndahl-index increases, shocks at the
sectoral level get more important for the uctuations of credit at the aggregate level.
This is supported by empirical evidence from Buch and Neugebauer (2011) who nd
that idiosyncratic shocks at the bank-level have a signicant impact on the volatility
of aggregate lending volumes in Eastern European countries.
2.4 Calibration
Table 2 summarizes the parameter values used in the simulation exercises below. The
elasticity of substitution between credit varieties, , is backed-out from the maximum
markups in the sample of EU27 banks. In analogy to the theoretical model, I use net
interest income as a percentage of earning assets, i.e. the net interest margin, as a proxy
for banks' markups8. The maximum net interest margin amounts to approximately 30
percent in the EU27 for the period 2000-2007. This yields an elasticity of substitution
of  =  m=(1    m) = 1:3=0:3 = 4:3. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and De Blas and Russ
(2011b) lay out the theoretical conditions for the relation between the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution between loan varieties, , and the dispersion parameter of the
Pareto distribution, . They show that      1 has to be satised to guarantee a
8For the details on the relationship between the markup and the net interest margin, see De Blas
and Russ (2010).
11meaningful solution for the aggregate price, or in the here described setup the aggregate
lending rate, r. In order to fulll this theoretical condition, I set  =  = 4:3 in the
simulations reported below.
[Table 2 about here.]
Following Gabaix (2009), I compute bank-level volatility as the cross-sectional
volatility of loan growth rates ln(Netloansit). For each year t = 2000   2007, I





















where git = zit   zit 1, zit = ln(Netloansit), and K = 100.







which is equal to 0.12 for the balanced panel (0.1 for the corresponding unbalanced
panel) as shown in Table 3. Bank-level volatility is thus very similar to the number
found by Gabaix (2009) for US manufacturing rms. As I want to concentrate on the
eects of nancial liberalization on granularity, I assume that the variance of bank-level
shocks does not signicantly change after opening up to international lending.
Table 3 shows that this assumption is mild: Bank-level volatility does not seem to
change signicantly after the EU-enlargement of 2004.
[Table 3 about here.]
The rest of the parameter values are standard and taken from De Blas and Russ (2010).
I simulate the model 1000 times and average over the 1000 simulated economies for the
results discussed in the following sections.
2.5 Results
Let us rst have a look at the model implications for the distribution of the variables of
interest. Second, the model will be extended by the concept of granularity in order to
analyze the eects of a skewed distribution of bank sizes for market concentration and
12the stability of aggregate lending. Table 1 presents evidence for a balanced panel of EU-
banks which is purged from sample composition eects for the period 2000-2007. The
numbers indicate that the average size of banks has increased over time. Concerning
concentration, the top 1 percent of banks held roughly 60 percent of total EU banking
assets in 2007. Furthermore, the mean-to-median ratio points to a highly skewed size-
distribution with values around 5 - for a symmetric distribution, the mean-to-median
ratio would equal one. The bank-level data underlines the importance of large banks in
the EU and thus the potential role for granularity as a driver of aggregate uctuations.
At the end of this section, the impact of facilitated entry into the banking sector on
market concentration and aggregate volatility will be assessed under nancial autarky.
2.5.1 The distribution of costs, markups, lending rates, and loan volumes
Figure 3 plots both the empirical probability density functions (PDFs) and the corre-
sponding cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for costs, markups, lending rates
and the resulting loan volumes across niches j. The PDF of the costs of active banks
in niche j shows that only a small fraction of active banks dispose of very low costs
close to c = 1. However, the distribution of the lowest costs does not follow a power
law itself. For lending rates - the product of marginal costs and markups - we observe
a PDF which is somewhat skewed to the left. Its shape resembles the shape of the
distribution of the lowest costs.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The distribution of loan volumes has a fat right tail and resembles the empirical
distribution of loan volumes in Figure 1. Loan volumes are interpreted here as a proxy
for banks' size. The model features a skewed distribution of bank sizes with the bulk
of banks being small to mid-sized while some banks are very large and dispose of large
market shares.
Under the Pareto-distributed eciency parameters zk(j), Figure 3 reveals that
markups have a Pareto-shape: The frequency of markups decays continuously as we go
from low markups up to the maximum Dixit-Stiglitz markup  m = 1:3. At the maximum
markup, the PDF displays a kink. The derivation of the theoretical distribution of the
markup can be found in Appendix A.3. It shows that, indeed, markups follow a Pareto
distribution as in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) which is given by








 if 1  m <  m
1 if m   m:
(22)
13In contrast to the distribution of markups in De Blas and Russ (2010) where eciency
parameters are drawn from a Fr echet distribution, the distribution of markups under
Pareto-eciency draws is independent of the number of rivals per niche, n. Hence, the
distribution of markups should not signicantly change in response to a change in the
regulation of entry into the nancial sector.
2.5.2 Increased contestability and stability in the closed economy
Which impact does regulatory policy have on the aggregate stability of lending in a
closed economy? If entry barriers in the banking sector are reduced, how does the
following increase in the number of rivals per niche - i.e. the increase in contestability
- impact on the variance of aggregate credit?
Table 4 illustrates that as the number of rivals per niche increases from n = 2
to n = 10, the Herndahl-index falls by nearly 40 percent from 0.0275 to 0.0173.
Accordingly, the volatility of aggregate loans drops by from 0.003 to 0.002 if the variance
of the cost shock is set to 2
u = 0:12 as indicated by the Bankscope data summarized
in Table 3. Hence, when competition gets more intense, the big banks get squeezed:
Concentration in the banking sector falls, and market shares across niches become more
similar. Due to the increase in competition, costs are reduced which leads to a drop
in the overall lending rate r. The drop in lending rates makes borrowing cheaper for
rms, such that aggregate loan demand increases.
[Table 4 about here.]
Note that in a setting with constant Dixit-Stiglitz markups  m = 
 1 as for example
in Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009), both aggregate lending rates, r, and concentra-
tion, HHI, are higher for each level of competition than in the setup with endogenous
markups here. Loan volumes are lower, accordingly. As long as u(j) represents a
sectoral shock, granularity is equally likely to hold in an economy with constant Dixit-
Stiglitz markups and in an economy with endogenous markups as the one presented
here. This is because in both kinds of models, sectoral cost shocks u(j) can be fully
passed onto rms since all banks in a niche are aected by the shock alike. Thus, bank-
level volatility is transmitted directly to the rest of the economy, because lending rates
r(j) change in response to micro-level shocks. Hence, there should be a link between
sectoral and aggregate volatility in both model setups.
However, idiosyncratic cost shocks that hit active banks are absorbed by lower
markups in those niches where the markup is less than the Dixit-Stiglitz markup.
Only in those niches where m(j) =  m will banks be able to pass on a change in their
14cost parameters. The theoretical distribution of markups (equation (63)) shows that
the probability of observing the maximum markup, Pr[m(j)   m] = 1   Pr[m(j) <
 m] =  m , decreases in the dispersion-parameter . As dispersion increases ( falls)
and banks' eciency levels vary over a larger range, the probability of observing the
maximum markup increases. This in turn raises the probability for granularity to hold.
Moreover, the smaller the number of active banks in the economy, J, the more likely
is the economy to be granular.
In contrast to this, all banks can entirely pass through cost shocks in a world with
constant markups. Consequently, idiosyncratic shocks are transmitted to the rest of
the economy to a smaller extent if markups are endogenous and if dispersion is low.
The economy is thus less likely to be granular than an economy featuring constant
markups.
3 Opening up to international lending: The two-
country model
Having seen the key features and implications of the model under nancial autarky, let
us now have a look at the model implications for the eects of cross-border banking on
the stability of aggregate lending. Recent empirical evidence points to the fact that,
generally, the presence of foreign banks has strengthened nancial sector stability in
emerging economies (for a survey, see Cull and Martinez Peria (2010)). However, the
specic organizational form of cross-border banking activities diers across regions.
While Eastern European economies host a large amount of multinational banks which
established local aliates in the region, emerging economies in Latin America and
Asia rather receive capital inows in the form of direct cross-border lending. Empirical
evidence suggests that the organizational form of international banking is important for
aggregate stability: During the global nancial crisis, capital outows from emerging
Europe were less severe than those from other emerging markets (see e.g. Herrmann
and Mihaljek (2010)).
The present section theoretically discusses the eects of these two forms of banking
sector integration on aggregate stability. First, the case of arms-length cross-border
lending will be analyzed. In this scenario, loan liberalization is modeled such that
domestic banks in each credit niche j face not only competition from their n   1
domestic rivals, but also from the n foreign rival banks that produce the corresponding
credit variety j abroad. Second, the case of FDI in the nancial sector, i.e. foreign bank
presence, will be assessed. In this setup, foreign banks may merge with domestic ones
15in their niche j, so that local lending via foreign subsidiaries of multinational banks is
allowed for. This scenario reects the dominant type of cross-border banking in Europe
where Eastern European countries host multinational banks from Western Europe. For
both liberalization scenarios, the stability implications of increased nancial integration
will be assessed using the theoretical model with banks of dierent size.
3.1 Loan Liberalization: Direct cross-border lending
The model economy is now opened up to cross-border activity. There are two regions,
country H and country F, that are linked via nancial markets, namely by direct
cross-border lending between banks and rms. The model structure for the case of loan
liberalization is illustrated in Figure 4. The two economies are setup as under nancial
autarky. However, banks in each niche face higher competition as they compete with
foreign banks now.
[Figure 4 about here.]
3.1.1 Model setup and equilibrium under loan liberalization
Let us concentrate for now on two symmetric countries H and F. In both countries,
banks draw their eciency parameters from a Pareto distribution as before, so that we
can rank banks according to their eciency (or:cost) draws which allows to single out
the two lowest-cost banks in each country, namely c1h(j) and c2h(j) in country H and
c1f(j) and c2f(j) in country F. Now, as all banks that oer variety j compete with each
other, a new cost structure evolves in both countries after loan liberalization. Opening
up the economy to international lending is thus similar to an increase in the number
of rivals per niche, n, which was studied for the autarky-case above.
The lowest-cost bank in each country is determined by taking the minimum of
the cost of the best domestic bank and the best foreign bank. The latter incurs an
additional cost due to distance, i  1. Buch (2005, 2003) shows that foreign lending is
more costly than domestic lending due to additional costs that arise from information
gathering in the foreign market and dierences in regulatory frameworks. Including
the additional cost from lending abroad, the cost parameter of the bank that supplies
the whole niche j in country i is given by cLL
1h = minfc1h;fc1fg and analogously
for country F. The second best bank in each niche in country H, which limits the
size of the markup that can be charged by the active bank, is determined by cLL
2h =
minfmax[c1h;fc1f];min[c2h;fc2f]g. Thus, bank j can supply credit in zero, one, or
16two niches depending on its cost relative to its foreign competitor and the distance
factors h;f.
Using the new cost structure in both countries, markups and lending rates are
computed as in the autarky case above. Note that if the distance factors are the same
in both countries and if they are equal to one, i.e. if banks can lend to rms abroad at
no additional cost, costs and hence markups and lending rates are exactly the same in
both countries. The best bank always supplies the entire market j, that is in both Home
and Foreign, and is limited in its setting of the markup by the second internationally
best bank.
In order to derive loan volumes in general and volumes of cross-border lending in
particular, the steady state of the model has to be solved for. Solving for the equilibrium
prices and quantities works in analogy to the autarky case. However, the consumer
budget constraints are extended by prots banks make abroad and amount to
qh = whhh + 
h + 
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f + 
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f are prots made by foreign banks in H while 
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h are prots made by home
banks in F. The balance of payments can be written as
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and goods market clearing in the open economy is given by
yi = qi + nxi
for country i = H;F. Hence, an export surplus in H is nanced by positive net prots
of foreign banks operating in H. If banks' prots are dierent in H and in F, then
trade does not have to be balanced.
The equilibrium allocation in the open economy can be determined by proceeding
in three steps.
Step 1. Firms' labor demand is determined as in the autarky case since labor
is assumed to be immobile across countries. Hence, take equation (7) for hh and
analogously for the foreign country for hf.
Deposits in each niche are determined by
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while banks' prots have to be aggregated over all niches and we distinguish between
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and analogously for h
f(j) and 
f
h(j). Note that since the best bank in niche j - either
from H or from F - may supply credit in both countries, deposits for credit supply
in niche j are supplied locally as they are entirely determined by credit demand and
the cost of the best bank. If there are no additional costs from lending abroad, i.e.
if h = f = 1, cLL
1 (j) is the same in both H and F. Consequently, deposits are
determined by local credit demand so that d(j) = l(j)cLL
1 (j) and d(j) = l(j)cLL
1 (j).
Step 3. Next, bank prots as well as deposits are aggregated over all niches j.
Hours worked, output and rm prots do not have to be aggregated any further as we
assume rms to be identical and can hence consider one representative rm only.





























so that we end up with a system of two equations in the two unknown wage rates wh
and wf. The system is solved using a non-linear equation solver.
3.1.2 Simulation results
Figure 5 plots the distribution of the variables of interest for the loan liberalization
scenario against the benchmark of a closed economy. A look at the CDFs reveals that
the autarky-case stochastically dominates the loan liberalization scenario for costs,
markups, and lending rates. That is, the probability of observing high realizations
of these three variables is higher in autarky than in the open economy with direct
cross-border lending. Hence, both costs and lending rates decline under loan liberal-
ization. This can also be seen from the PDFs where the probability mas shifts to left,
i.e. towards lower cost-realizations. The simulation results show that approximately 50
18percent of the 1000 average markups are lower after opening up the economy for inter-
national lending. All 1000 average lending rates are lower under liberalization in both
H and F, so that rms are better o under internationally integrated loan markets.
Concerning the lending volumes, the PDF in Figure 5 illustrates that they do not
change by much after liberalization. The distribution is somewhat more tilted towards
its mean: middle realizations are observed somewhat more frequently while the very
large realizations get a little less frequent. Interpreting loan volumes as a proxy for
banks' size, we obtain that opening up the economy to international lending yields a
somewhat more equal distribution of bank sizes and hence less concentration. This is
similar to what we observed for the closed economy when increasing contestability in the
banking sector. The small change in lending volumes results from the fact that both,
sectoral lending rates, r(j), and aggregate the lending rate r fall after liberalization
while the total demand for loans by the representative rm, i.e. the wage bill, is not
signicantly altered after liberalization. As a consequence, we do not see much of
a change in the distribution of sectoral loan demand l(j). Overall, aggregate credit
slightly increases after loan liberalization in all of the 1000 simulated economies with
a rise of 1% on average.
Concentration marginally decreases after opening up the economy to foreign lend-
ing, as in the simulation for intensied competition in the closed economy. Conse-
quently, the aggregate volatility of total lending in both countries is reduced if inter-
national lending is allowed for.
[Figure 5 about here.]
When it comes to cross-border lending, the model implies that half of the niches
in each country are supplied by foreign banks if countries are symmetric and if banks
do not incur any additional costs when lending abroad. At the same time, the share of
cross-border lending in total lending is smaller with approximately 44 percent, meaning
that foreign banks supplying market niches abroad are smaller (have smaller lending
volumes in the foreign market) than domestic banks, on average. Finally, having a look
at the stability of aggregate cross-border lending, I nd that the latter is signicantly
more volatile than total lending. This is due to the fact that concentration is higher in
the sample of banks that are internationally active than for the whole sample of banks.
If it is costly for banks to lend abroad, e.g. due to transaction or information costs
related to international lending, and hence the distance factor is larger than one, the
share of niches as well as the share of cross-border lending in total lending decreases
in the two countries. For example, if both countries face distance costs of 10 percent,
the fraction of niches supplied by foreign banks drops from 50 percent down to 40
19percent while the share of cross-border credit ows in total credit even drops to about
30 percent.
Moreover, if transaction costs increase and the volume of cross-border lending falls,
the volatility of cross-border lending rises, thus making international capital ows less
stable. Consequently, in order to stabilize cross-border lending ows, regulatory poli-
cies should be harmonized across countries such that distance costs are reduced: The
smaller the cost of lending abroad, the higher are competitive pressures from nancial
liberalization and thus the more stable are cross-border credit ows.
An increase in contestability, i.e. in the number of rivals in each country, has
qualitatively the same eects as under nancial autarky. It reduces lending rates,
concentration and hence volatility and raises aggregate lending volumes. Regulatory
policy should thus reduce the barriers to entry in the banking sector in order to foster
competition and hence stability.
3.2 FDI in the banking sector
In contrast to the scenario with direct cross-border lending, the following setup looks
at a world where banks in each niche can merge with foreign banks which are active
in the same market niche j abroad. Hence, multinational banks extend credit via local
subsidiaries and branches in the foreign country. This scenario mirrors the dominating
form of nancial integration in Europe.
Vander Vennet (2003) presents empirical evidence for Europe that the best, i.e.
the most productive foreign banks tend to takeover the best domestic banks in each
market segment. Empirical ndings by Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005a,b) point
into the same direction: Foreign-owned banks in European transition economies are
found to be more cost-ecient than domestic ones. Based on these ndings, foreign
takeovers are modeled as follows. Having drawn their eciency parameters from the
Pareto-distribution as before, the best international bank in niche j takes over the best
bank in niche j abroad by paying a takeover fee which is suciently high to make the
target bank at least as well o as without the merger. The merged bank then serves the
foreign market under a new, mixed cost cM
1 (j) = c1f(j)1=FDIc1h(j)1 (1=FDI) given that
it cannot entirely establish its production technology abroad. The domestic market
of the parent bank is served under the same cost as before, namely at c1. As it is
only meaningful that active banks merge, i.e. the lowest-cost ones, the cost structure
of the second-best banks remain the same as under autarky. Overall, costs decrease
when opening up the economy to foreign mergers and acquisitions, because costs either
remain at c1(j) or drop down to cM
1 (j).
203.2.1 Model setup and equilibrium under FDI liberalization
The open economy equilibrium under FDI liberalization can be solved for very similarly
to the loan liberalization case. The only dierence concerns takeover fees which are
paid to the target bank by the lowest cost bank in niche j, i.e. the parent bank of the
merger.
Following De Blas and Russ (2010), the buyout price oered to the target has to
be at least as big as the prot the target bank would earn without merging in the open
economy. Both the parent and the target take interest rates under FDI liberalization
in all other niches as given. The resulting buyout fee in niche J is then given by























where raut(j) is the autarky-lending rate that the home bank would charge if there were
no takeovers at all while rfdi is the aggregate lending rate that the market participants
take as given under FDI-liberalization where takeovers take place whenever C1i(j) <
C1k(j), where i;k = F;H and i 6= k.
Moreover, the consumers' budget constraints now include prots net of the aggre-
gated takeover fees Vh and Vf:
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and hence net exports can be expressed as
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The aggregate resource constraint, y + y, is fullled if
yh + yf   (whhh + wfhf + 
h + 
h
h +  rhdh + nxh + 
f + 
f
f +  rfdf + nxf) = 0:
Since Vh and Vf appear in both the consumers' budget constraints qh;qf and the ex-
pression for net exports nxh;nxf, they cancel out in the aggregate resource constraints.
Thus, the resource constraints are the same in the loan liberalization and in the FDI
scenario.
213.2.2 Simulation results
Figure 6 compares the distribution of costs, markups, lending rates and lending vol-
umes under FDI liberalization to the case of nancial autarky. It shows that, for the
lowest costs, the closed economy case stochastically dominates the CDF under FDI
liberalization, whereas for the markup, the CDF under FDI dominates the CDF under
autarky. Intuitively, this means that markups increase under liberalization towards
FDI in the nancial sector. This is explained as follows. In those niches where the
markup in the closed economy is maximal, i.e. m(j)AUT =  m, it will remain the same
when FDI is allowed for. This is because the spread between the lowest and the second
lowest cost stays at least equal or gets bigger under FDI, and m(j) is already at the
optimal Dixit-Stiglitz level which only depends on the constant elasticity of substitu-
tion between varieties, . In those niches where the markup in the closed economy
is smaller than the Dixit-Stiglitz markup  m, it stays the same or increases after FDI
liberalization, since the cost of the merged bank is smaller than the cost under au-
tarky (cM
1 (j) < c1(j)), so that the spread between c2(j) and the lowest cost grows.
Hence, m(j)FDI is either the same as m(j)AUT or it is larger, implying that average
markups must increase. In fact, all of the 1000 average markups are higher under FDI
liberalization.
[Figure 6 about here.]
For the lending rate, however, the CDFs for the FDI and the autarky-case are nearly
identical. There is no single average lending rate which is higher after allowing for FDI
in the banking sector. Thus, rms do not incur higher nancing costs even though
markups increase. For those niches where the maximum markup has been charged
under autarky already, lending rates are given by r(j) = c1(j) m r which implies that
borrowing in those niches may get cheaper as cM
1 (j) < c1(j). In the other niches where
markups have been less than the maximum, FDI liberalization has no eect on lending
rates, given that lending rates are determined by r(j) = c2(j) r and c2(j) stays the
same. Hence, the overall lending rate r will fall a little after FDI liberalization due to
the niches where  m = mAUT(j), but it cannot increase, since in the remaining niches,
it stays the same as in the closed economy given that c2 is the same as before.
Figure 7 contrasts the distributions under FDI liberalization with those under loan
liberalization and under nancial autarky. The distributions of costs point to the
fact that banks are least ecient under autarky. As the economy is opened up to
international lending, active banks in each niche get more ecient. If banks do not
incur additional costs when lending abroad, costs are lowest under loan liberalization,
while under FDI, costs are reduced compared with autarky, but less than under direct
22foreign lending since merged banks supply under the mixed cost cM
1 (j) > cLL
1 (j).
Concerning markups, Figure 7 illustrates that the distribution under FDI stochas-
tically dominates the ones under autarky and under direct cross-border lending. Hence,
markups are highest under FDI. However, the increased markups after foreign takeovers
have no negative implications for the lending costs of rms. Lending rates under FDI
are even a little lower than under autarky. Lending rates either decrease under FDI
liberalization (if m(j) =  m) or stay the same and thus reduce rm's nancing costs.
Why can markups be higher under FDI at the same lending rate as under autarky?
The increase in markups is due to the fact that eciency of the best banks in each
niche picks up while the second best rival's cost stays the same. Consequently, the gap
between the best and the second best bank in niche j grows which automatically allows
for higher markups.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Let us now have a look at the eects of FDI liberalization on macroeconomic sta-
bility. Setting the distance factor under FDI, FDI, equal to 2 for both countries H
and F, the simulation results show that the volatility of aggregate credit decreases
after opening up the economy to foreign takeovers. This is driven by the fact that the
Herndahl-index drops by roughly 10 percent when opening up. However, concentra-
tion drops less than under the loan liberalization scenario, because lending rates drop
by less under FDI liberalization.
However, the patterns of cross-border lending are dierent under loan liberalization
and FDI. Even if we set the parameter values such that the share of niches supplied by
foreign banks is one half in both scenarios (if h = f = 1), the share of cross-border
lending in total lending is signicantly smaller under FDI with 20 percent compared
to 40 percent under loan liberalization. Hence, foreign banks are smaller under FDI,
meaning that their loan volumes are smaller than the loan volumes of foreign banks
under direct cross-border lending. This is due to the fact that lending rates drop by
more under loan liberalization and hence credit demand is higher than under direct
cross-border lending than under FDI.
Another point that can be made when comparing nancial stability under loan
versus FDI liberalization concerns the dierent evolution of markups. Following the
"concentration-stability hypothesis"(see e.g. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006)),
the increase in markups under FDI liberalization increases the resistibility of banks
against adverse shocks: Higher markups increase banks' prots and thus provide a
buer against adverse shocks. Furthermore, higher markups increase the bank's char-
ter value which reduces its incentives to take excessive risks. This in turn reduces
23the probability of systemic banking crisis and thus supports stability in the nancial
system. In addition to this, in the model used here, an increase in markups does not
correspond to an increase in concentration and increased lending rates. Following the
argument by Boyd and De Nicol o (2005), as lending rates do not rise, there are no in-
centives for rms to assume greater risk. The model above thus establishes a negative
link between concentration and stability. As concentration decreases, the volatility of
lending decreases so that stability is enhanced. Overall, increased markups may be an
additional argument for higher stability under FDI liberalization compared to direct
cross-border lending. Increasing contestability in the FDI scenario has qualitatively the
same eects as in the benchmark case of nancial autarky. Lending rates, concentration
and hence the aggregate volatility of credit decreases in the degree of contestability,
n while loan volumes increase. Markups do not signicantly change as shown by the
theoretical distribution of markups which is independent of the level of contestability.
Compared to the scenario with direct cross-border lending and no distance costs
(f = h = 1), the volatility of total loans is the same under FDI, while the volatility of
cross-border lending is a little higher under loan liberalization (even though the share
of cross-border in total lending is higher under loan liberalization). Once distance
costs of 10 percent are introduced in the loan liberalization scenario (f = h = 1:1),
this pattern is reinforced: With foreign mergers and acquisitions, the volatility of
cross-border lending is just one third the volatility under arms-length international
lending, depending on the degree of contestability. Moreover, the share of cross-border
lending under FDI is up to ve times the share under loan liberalization with 10-percent
distance costs. The more intense competition, the larger the dierence between the
shares of cross-border lending under FDI versus loan liberalization.
Thus, foreign lending via local subsidiaries is more stable than arms-length cross-
border lending in the model. This pattern is in line with the empirical evidence from
the nancial crisis. Parent banks from Western Europe engaged in Eastern Europe
sticked to their foreign aliates and did not reduce cross-border lending by as much
as banks handing out cross-border loans directly9.
9Even though the nancial crisis was triggered by a common shock to the nancial sector, individual
banks were dierently aected due to dierent exposures to the US-subprime market (see Buch,
Eickmeier, and Prieto (2010)). Hence, the common shock aected banks dierently at the idiosyncratic
level.
244 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to analyze the role that large banks play for the stability of
aggregate total and cross-border lending. In order to understand the microeconomic
background for macroeconomic stability in the context of banking sector integration,
I employ a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks which lend to rms
under imperfect competition. The model by De Blas and Russ (2010) is extended
to account for the concept of granularity which links volatility at the bank-level to
aggregate outcomes.
The simulation results point to the fact that banking sector integration involving
a fat-tailed bank size distribution lowers the volatility of aggregate lending. Hence,
considering the channel of granularity at the level of loan volumes only, nancial inte-
gration seems to foster macroeconomic stability. Comparing direct cross-border lending
to FDI in the banking sector, the model implies more stable cross-border lending ows
under the latter form of integration. This model outcome is in line with the empirical
evidence on the stability implications of dierent forms of banking sector integration:
Liberalization towards FDI in the banking leads to more stable lending than cross-
border lending at arms-length does.
The model may thus inform the current debate on changes in the international
regulation of the banking sector. Looking at the eects of shocks to large banks on the
stability of cross-border lending only, the theoretical results suggest that banking sector
integration and the associated international capital ows reduce concentration and sup-
port aggregate stability. Hence, in the model setup presented above, the introduction of
capital controls by emerging market economies would not be welfare-enhancing. More
generally, nancial protectionism which reduces overall cross-border activity would lead
to less contestability in the above presented framework and would thus have a nega-
tive eect on the aggregate stability of lending. However, it has to be kept in mind
that there are other important mechanisms which aect the stability of cross-border
lending. For instance, adverse shocks to one region may spill-over to other regions via
asset price eects, interbank markets or changes in risk perceptions. These additional
channels of contagion are not modeled here.
There are several tasks that could be addressed in future research. In the model
above, I only study how shocks to changes in loan volumes - i.e. variations at the
intensive margin - aect the aggregate stability of credit. However, the exit and entry
of banks may be important for macroeconomic stability. It may thus be an interesting
avenue for future research to follow the lines of Di Giovanni, Levchenko, and M ejean
(2011) who study the role of individual rms in generating aggregate uctuations: The
25authors combine a strand of the literature which addresses the link between the exten-
sive margin and aggregate uctuations (see for example Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and
Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007)) with the granularity literature. It may be instruc-
tive to investigate how both variation at the intensive and at the extensive margin of
lending impact on the aggregate stability of credit. Moreover, including the extensive
margin in the model above may be a promising starting point to study the internation-
alization patterns of banks by allowing for dierent xed costs of entry for domestic
and foreign markets as in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) for heterogeneous rms.
26References
F. Allen and D. Gale. Financial contagion. Journal of political economy, 108:1{33,
2000.
F. Allen, T. Beck, E. Carletti, P.R. Lane, D. Schoenmaker, and W. Wagner. Cross-
Border Banking in Europe: Implications for Financial Stability and Macroeconomic
Policies. CEPR, Brussels, 2011.
S.P. Anderson, A. De Palma, and J.F. Thisse. The CES is a discrete choice model?
Economics Letters, 24(2):139{140, 1987.
T. Beck, A. Demirguc-Kunt, and R. Levine. Bank concentration, competition, and
crises: First results. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(5):1581{1603, 2006.
E. Bergloef, Y. Korniyenko, A. Plekhanov, and J. Zettelmeyer. Understanding the crisis
in emerging Europe. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Working
Paper 109, 2009.
B.S. Bernanke, M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist. The nancial accelerator in a quantitative
business cycle framework. Handbook of macroeconomics, 1:1341{1393, 1999.
A.B. Bernard, J. Eaton, J.B. Jensen, and S. Kortum. Plants and Productivity in
International Trade. American Economic Review, 93(4):1268{1290, 2003.
F. Bilbiie, F. Ghironi, and M. Melitz. Endogenous entry, product variety, and business
cycles. NBER Working Papers, No. 13646, 2007.
J.P. Bonin, I. Hasan, and P. Wachtel. Privatization matters: Bank eciency in tran-
sition countries. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(8-9):2155{2178, 2005a.
J.P. Bonin, I. Hasan, and P. Wachtel. Bank performance, eciency and ownership in
transition countries. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(1):31{53, 2005b.
J.H. Boyd and G. De Nicol o. The theory of bank risk taking and competition revisited.
The Journal of Finance, 60(3):1329{1343, 2005.
B. Bruggemann, J. Kleinert, and E. Prieto. A gravity equation of bank loans. mimeo,
May 2011.
M.K. Brunnermeier and L.H. Pedersen. Market liquidity and funding liquidity. Review
of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2009.
C. Buch, S. Eickmeier, and E. Prieto. Macroeconomic Factors and Micro-Level Bank
Risk. CES-Ifo Working Paper No. 3194, September 2010.
27C. Buch, K. Russ, and M. Schnitzer. Systemic Risk in Financial Intermediation: Gran-
ularity, Bank Size, and Aggregate Volatility. in preparation, 2011a.
C.M. Buch. Information or Regulation: What Drives the International Activities of
Commercial Banks? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, pages 851{869, 2003.
C.M. Buch. Distance and international banking. Review of International Economics,
13(4):787{804, 2005.
C.M. Buch and K. Neugebauer. Bank-specic shocks and the real economy. Journal
of Banking & Finance, 2011.
C.M. Buch, C.T. Koch, and M. Koetter. Size, productivity, and international banking.
Journal of International Economics, Forthcoming 2011b.
E. Carletti, P. Hartmann, and G. Spagnolo. Bank mergers, competition, and liquidity.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39(5):1067{1105, 2007.
N. Cetorelli and L.S. Goldberg. Globalized banks: Lending to emerging markets in the
crisis. Sta Reports, 377, 2009.
N. Cetorelli and L.S. Goldberg. Global banks and international shock transmission:
Evidence from the crisis. IMF Economic Review, 59(1):41{76, 2010.
Robert Cull and Maria S. Martinez Peria. Foreign Bank Participation in Develop-
ing Countries: What Do We Know About the Drivers and Consequences of this
Phenomenon? Policy Research Paper 5398, The World Bank, August 2010.
O. De Bandt and E.P. Davis. Competition, contestability and market structure in
european banking sectors on the eve of emu. Journal of Banking & Finance, 24(6):
1045{1066, 2000.
B. De Blas and K. Russ. All Banks Great, Small, and Global: Loan pricing and foreign
competition. University of California in Davis, mimeo, April 2011a.
B. De Blas and K. Russ. Understanding Markups in the Open Economy under Bertrand
Competition. University of California in Davis, mimeo, September 2011b.
B. De Blas and K.N. Russ. FDI in the Banking Sector. NBER Working Papers, (No.
16029), 2010.
R. De Haas and N. Van Horen. Running for the exit: international banks and crisis
transmission. DNB Working Papers No. 279, February 2011.
28J. Di Giovanni and A.A. Levchenko. International Trade and Aggregate Fluctuations
in Granular Economies. February. RSIE Discussion Paper, 585, 2009.
J. Di Giovanni, A.A. Levchenko, and R. Ranciere. Power Laws in Firm Size and
Openness to Trade: Measurement and Implications. IMF Working Papers, 109(201):
1{31, 2010.
J. Di Giovanni, A.A. Levchenko, and I. M ejean. Firms, Destinations, and Aggregate
Fluctuations. mimeo, June, 2011.
EBRD. EBRD Transition Report 2009: Transition in Crisis? Technical report, Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2009.
EBRD. Vienna initiative - moving to a new phase. Technical report, European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, 2011.
ECB. EU Banking Structures. Technical report, European Central Bank, 2007.
X. Gabaix. The granular origins of aggregate uctuations. NBER Working Papers,
(No. 15286), August 2009.
X. Gabaix. The granular origins of aggregate uctuations. Econometrica, 79 (3):733{
772, May 2011.
A. Gerali, S. Neri, L. Sessa, and F.M. Signoretti. Credit and banking in a dsge model
of the euro area. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42:107{141, 2010.
F. Ghironi and M.J. Melitz. International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics with
Heterogeneous Firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3):865{915, 2005.
F. Ghironi and V. Stebunovs. The domestic and international eects of interstate US
banking. Technical Report NBER Working Paper No. 16613, December 2010.
E. Helpman, M.J. Melitz, and S.R. Yeaple. Export versus FDI with heterogeneous
rms. The American Economic Review, 94(1):300{316, 2004.
S. Herrmann and D. Mihaljek. The Determinants of Cross-Border Bank Flows to
Emerging Markets: New Empirical Evidence on the Spread of Financial Crises. BIS
Working Paper No. 315, July 2010.
O. Huelsewig, E. Mayer, and T. Wollmershaeuser. Bank behavior, incomplete interest
rate pass-through, and the cost channel of monetary policy transmission. Economic
Modelling, 26(6):1310{1327, 2009.
29N. Kiyotaki and J. Moore. Credit chains. Journal of Political Economy, 105(21):
211{248, 1997.
H.J. Malik and R. Trudel. Probability density function of quotient of order statistics
from the pareto, power and weibull distributions. Communications in Statistics-
Theory and Methods, 11(7):801{814, 1982.
F. S. Mandelman. Business Cycles: A Role for Monopolistic Competition in the Bank-
ing Sector. Journal of International Economics, 81(1):122{138, 2010.
R. McCauley, P. McGuire, and G. von Peter. The architecture of global banking: from
international to multinational? BIS Quarterly Review, pages 25{37, 2010.
M. Melitz. The impact of trade on aggregate industry productivity and intra-industry
reallocations. Econometrica, 71(6):1695{1725, 2003.
M.H. Pesaran and T.T. Xu. Business cycle eects of credit and technology shocks in
a dsge model with rm defaults. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6027, pages {, October
2011.
D. Schoenmaker and W.B. Wagner. The Impact of Cross-Border Banking on Financial
Stability. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 11-054/ DSF 18, February 2011.
R. Vander Vennet. Cross-Border Mergers in European Banking and Bank Eciency.
In H. Herrmann and R. Lipsey, editors, Foreign direct investment in the real and
nancial sector of industrial. Springer, 2003.
30A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate interest rate







, take (9) to













































































A.2 Steady State in the closed economy
As a rst step, compute labor supply hs as a function of the wage rate w. For this goal,
substitute q from the labor supply equation (14) and y from the production function
in the aggregate resource constraint y = q and solve for h(w):



































































































Further simplify the exponent of A:
(1 + )   (x + )
(x + )x
=
 [(1 + )   (x + )]
x(x + )
(42)
and rewrite the nominator as
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41 + (1   )
| {z }
x





=  [(1   )x] : (45)
































x+ = q(r) (48)
The lending rate r is determined above in the duopolistic competition problem from
each niche j (see equation (11)).
32A.3 Distributions of model variables








with support (0;1] as the mimimum of z equals b = 0:1 and the maximum is xed at
B = 1. It implies that the marginal cost of loaning out 1 EUR, c = 1=z, is greater than
the deposit rate  r, i.e. that c > 1. Hence, the probability that c < 1, F(z > 1) = 0.
How to draw cost-parameters from the Pareto function





= 1   (bc)
 (50)
(bc)














Parameter values: b = 0:1 as in Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009),  = 4:3; = 4:3.
How to draw cost-parameters from the bounded Pareto function
Since the cost parameter c needs to be greater of equal to 1, the support of the eciency
parameter z = 1=c is limited to z 2 (0;1]. Hence, the Pareto distribution needs to be
limited with the lower bound b = 0:1 as above and an upper bound B = 1. The
corresponding bounded Pareto function is given by




























Parameter values: b = 0:1, B = 1,  = 4:3; = 4:3.
Distribution of the cost parameter c
We have that eciency z = 1=c  Pareto(b;B;) = F(z;b;B;) = Pr(Z  z). To
obtain the distribution of c, write down the complementary distribution Gc(c) to start
with:
G
c(c) = Pr(C > c) = Pr(1=Z > c) = Pr(Z  1=c) = F(c
 1;b;B;)
33Hence, the distribution of c is given by
G(c) = 1   G
c(c) = 1   F(c
 1;b;B;) = 1  
1   (bc)
1   (b=B) (56)
=
(bc)   (b=B)
1   (b=B) (57)




























Derive the distribution of the markup: unbounded Pareto distribution
Following Malik and Trudel (1982), the quotient of two order statistics that are inde-
pendently drawn from a Pareto distribution can be derived as follows.
Given that eciency Z  Pareto with support [0;1], i.e. C 2 [0;1], the rst step
consists in deriving the PDF of the ratio Q =
Zi
Zj where i < j and Z1 < Z2 < ::: < Zn.
According to Malik and Trudel (1982), the PDF of Q is given by
h(q) =
q n j 1





where (a;b) is the Beta-function (a;b) =
(a 1)!(b 1)!
(a+b 1)! . As I want to compute h(q) for
the highest and the second-highest eciency level, I set i = n   1 and j = n, so that


























Let us now turn to the ratio ~ M =
C2
C1 = 1=Q. The complementary distribution of ~ M is
given by
F
c(~ m) = Pr( ~ M  ~ m)
= Pr(1=Q  ~ m) = Pr(Q  1=~ m)
= H(~ m
 1) :
34Hence, I have that
F(~ m) = 1   F
c(~ m) = 1   H(~ m





which shows that the cost-ratio ~ M = C2=C1 follows a Pareto-distribution with mini-
mum b = 1. The distribution of the markup M thus also follows a Pareto-distribution.
However, it is truncated at the Dixit-Stiglitz markup  m, such that








 if 1  m <  m
1 if m   m
(63)
This is the same result as in Bernard et al. (2003). The probability of observing
the maximum markup is independent of the number of rivals n. As dispersion in-
creases ( falls), the probability of observing the maximum markup, Pr[M(j)   m] =
1   Pr[M(j)   m] =  m  increases. Thus, the higher the dispersion of cost parame-
ters (the more fat-tailed the distribution of cost parameters), the more more likely is
granularity to hold since banks can pass cost shocks on to rms only if charging  m.
Lending rates
As in De Blas and Russ (2011b), the distribution of markups is independent of C1(j)
and C2(j), so that the expected lending rate can be written as
E[r(j)] = Pr[M(j)   m] mE[C1(j)] + Pr[M(j)   m]E[C2(j)] :
The CDF and PDF of the cost parameters are given by GC(c) = (bc) and gC(c) =
bc 1, respectively.
















= Pr[M(j)   m] m
1 E[C1(j)












Distribution of loan volumes (bank size)























35where ` = wh. For granularity to hold, the loan volume must follow a power law
Pr(l(j) > s) = Cs
  (71)
with  close to one.
36Table 1: Asset Concentration in the EU














2000 1511 2.5 58.3 76.7 5.2 .25
2001 1511 2.5 58.5 77.0 5.2 .25
2002 1511 2.8 54.1 74.8 4.7 .21
2003 1511 3.4 53.6 74.7 4.7 .20
2004 1511 3.9 54.4 75.2 4.8 .21
2005 1511 3.7 55.1 75.8 4.9 .20
2006 1511 4.7 57.4 77.4 5.3 .21
2007 1511 5.6 57.5 77.7 5.4 .21
Table 1 shows how asset concentration has evolved over time for a balanced panel including the
same banks for the pre-crisis period 2000-2007. The higher the share of assets held by the largest
x % of banks, the higher concentration. The mean-to-median ratio equals one for a symmetric
distribution. The higher the mean-to-median ratio, the more skewed to the right is the distribution
of bank sizes. The Hirschman-Herndahl index (HHI) measures concentration. It equals one for
monopolistic markets and zero in case of perfect competition. The higher the HHI, the more
concentrated the banking sector.
37Table 2: Parameter values
Parameter Value Description
 4.3 Shape parameter of the distribution of eciency levels
 4.3 Elasticity of substitution between credit varieties
n [2,100] Number of rivals per niche
J 100 Number of niches
 i 0.12 Sectoral shock variance
 1 Elasticity of labor supply
 2 Coecient of relative risk aversion
 0.96 Subjective discount factor
1    0.64 Labor share of income
38Table 3: Idiosyncratic Volatility in the EU










Idiosyncratic volatility is dened here as the cross-sectional standard deviation of loan growth per
year as in Gabaix (2011). The table compares values for the balanced panel of banks (see Table 1)
to the unbalanced panel.
39Table 4: Values of aggregate variables for dierent levels of contestability
n m r `
p
HHI
2 1.154 0.075 0.525 0.027
10 1.154 0.053 0.539 0.017
100 1.154 0.032 0.552 0.005
Table 4 shows simulated average outcomes for markups m, lending rates r, loan volumes `, and the
squareroot of the Herndahl-index. n denotes the number of rivals per niche, i.e. contestability.
40Figure 1: Empirical Histograms of Bank Sizes in the EU
41Figure 2: Bank size distributions: Empirical histograms and tted Pareto
distributions
42Figure 3: CDFs and PDF under autarky
43Figure 4: Structure of the Two-Country Model: Loan Liberalization
44Figure 5: CDFs and PDFs for the closed and open economy, with and
without distance factor
45Figure 6: CDFs and PDFs: Closed economy vs. FDI liberalization
46Figure 7: CDFs for autarky, loan liberalization, and FDI
47